ABSTRACT
In Sameness and Substance Renewed David Wiggins aims to present the main strands of his strongly interconnected metaphysical ideas in as clear and direct a way as possible, having progressively refi ned and refocused them in the course of three major books. At the center of this web is a thesis which Wiggins calls the thesis of the sortal dependency of individuation (2001, 55), though at times he seems prepared to call it the sortal dependency of identity (2001, 23), and which he usually refers to as D.1 My aim here is to determine, insofar as I can, what this thesis actually claims and whether it is a thesis (or, perhaps, if there is any ambiguity in its content, a group of theses) that we should accept. The spirit of my engagement with the results of Wiggins’ refl ections is one of considerable admiration tinged with a certain degree of skepticism, and what has emerged here will, I hope, at least be of interest to others who are, like myself, moved to think seriously about his body of work.
