ABSTRACT
The concept of a ‘special relationship’ is very problematic, in that, in general, it is the weaker power which needs it: the stronger power tends to get what it wants without such supplication. When the stronger power – the United States, say – does refer to having a special relationship with another country, it is generally for one of two reasons. It can actually need the help of the other power, such as that of the United Kingdom in the Iraq crisis; or it can be acting in a kindly fashion towards that power’s leadership. In this context, it is useful to recall the incident chronicled by Raymond Seitz, American ambassador to the United Kingdom from 1991 to 1994, in his memoir, Over Here: ‘As was the custom, [Prime Minister] John Major went to Washington a few weeks after the President’s inauguration. I preceded him by a couple of days in order to scout out the tricky political terrain. . . . Just before the Prime Minister arrived at the White House, Clinton was sitting with a few aides in the Oval Office. “Don’t forget to say ‘special relationship’ when the press comes in”, one of them joked – a little like “don’t forget to put out the cat”. “Oh, yes”, Clinton said. “How could I forget? The ‘special relationship’!” And he threw back his head and laughed’.1
