ABSTRACT
Since India’s independence in 1947, the Indian Army has been involved nearly continuously in political and military operations to counter violent internal threats, including armed rebellions, to the peace and territorial integrity of the Indian Union. Although the causes of, and the conditions experienced with, each situation necessitated different approaches, the Indian Army developed principles, guidelines, and ideas to approaching insurgency movements and other forms of low-intensity conflict. Yet until recently the Indian Army had not formulated its best practices from its decades of experience with counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns into formal doctrine. Then, in December 2006, the Indian Army released its Doctrine for Sub-Conventional Operations (DSCO) (Indian Army 2006). The DSCO was actually the second doctrinal document the Indian Army
had released in the space of two years. In October 2004, the Indian Army promulgated the Indian Army Doctrine (IAD) (Indian Army 2004) in classified and publicly available versions. IAD is fairly comprehensive in scope, and it defines doctrine and strategy, examines the strategic environment, elaborates the principles of war, categorizes different types of war, and considers the impact of technology and the revolution in military affairs on war fighting. It also discusses the doctrinal aspects of conducting conventional operations as well as operations other than war. The DSCO flows from the IAD and focuses on the principles and practices
best suited for engaging in sub-conventional operations, which include counterterrorism, COIN, and proxy wars. The DSCO lays down principles for the conduct of such operations. Compared with the IAD, the DSCO is shorter, much less ambitious, not well drafted, and drifts from one issue to another, giving the impression of accommodating divergent views rather than providing cohesive doctrine. As a doctrinal document, the DSCO does not compare favorably, for example, with the U.S. Army and Marine Corps’ Counterinsurgency Field Manual, which was also publicly released in December 2006.1
Nevertheless, the IAD and the DSCO together provide a basis for understanding the evolution and nature of COIN doctrine in the Indian Army.
