ABSTRACT
In December 2006, the Indian Army and the U.S. Army and Marine Corps respectively issued new doctrines on conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations (Doctrine for Sub-Conventional Operations (Indian Army 2006); Counterinsurgency Field Manual (U.S. Army and Marine Corps 2007)). The near simultaneous release of the Indian and U.S. doctrines revealed that both countries had engaged at the same time in developing doctrine applicable to COIN. To the knowledge of the Indian and U.S. participants of this research project, development of the Indian and U.S. doctrines occurred independently, with no attempts to share lessons learned, best practices, and doctrinal principles. This fortuitous coincidence creates the opportunity to engage in comparative analysis of the two doctrines. In keeping with the objective of gleaning lessons from India’s experiences fighting counterinsurgencies, this chapter focuses on what the United States can learn from the Indian doctrine applicable to COIN. Comparative analysis of the two doctrines provides, however, food for thought about larger issues, including the importance of doctrine for COIN operations and the relationship between democracy and COIN doctrine.
