ABSTRACT
One of the central debates in US foreign policy for over 50 years has been how to handle the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since the collapse of the peace process in 2000, September 11, 2001 and the 2003 Iraq War, this debate has become particularly acute as policymakers and academics grapple with numerous threats and challenges to the US emanating from the Middle East. A key question, in this regard, has been whether the US should focus on managing or resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. A few people associated with the George W. Bush Administration argue that the Clinton Administration focused too much on conflict resolution, contributing to the collapse of the peace process and a region-wide deterioration. Many others argue and that the George W. Bush Administration has focused too little on conflict resolution, with highly negative consequences
for US interests in the Middle East. They assert that this policy was a function primarily of domestic political factors such as the power of the pro-Israel lobby or cultural/ideological sympathy with Israel. They argue that only a forceful concerted US drive for conflict resolution can rescue the situation.5 This chapter examines such claims and considers the implications for US policy in the region.
