ABSTRACT
There is a widespread belief in Hungary that the best revenge the new democracy could take for the decades of communist rule it experienced at the hands of an unscrupulous and rapacious nomenklatura is to live well and to prosper.1 Economic redress for political injustice has been the Hungarian answer to de-communization and transitional justice, the two intertwined processes that have gained prominence throughout the post-communist Eastern European bloc. While its neighbors have struggled to deal with their dictatorial experience by reexamining their recent history, adopting lustration, bringing communist officials and secret agents to court, and opening the secret archives, Hungarians have embraced the position that “the best way to deal with the past is to do better now.”2 What exactly “doing better” means has never been spelled out, perhaps because ordinary citizens have generally been disinterested in the subject, the political class has been embroiled in its daily struggle for the people’s minds and votes, and all Hungarians have taken pride in their exceptionally mild communist regime. In this general climate of apathy for the process of coming to terms with the past, the question we should raise is not “why Hungary failed to take a firmer stand toward its recent past?” but rather “why did it pursue limited lustration, file access and court proceedings at all?” Why did it stop short of embracing the Spanish model of “forgiving and forgetting,” when other European post-communist countries were inclined to “prosecute and punish” former communist officials and secret agents? The answer lies partly with the nature of Hungary’s communist regime, partly with its type of transition and exit from communism, and partly with its continuing post-communist struggle for power.
