ABSTRACT
Predictably then, some scholars have argued that the NPT has been far from effective in the objective of preventing proliferation and the disarmament of nuclear weapons. They point to the existing global nuclear arsenal of over 27,000 weapons and the increase in the number of states known to possess nuclear weapons from the original five in 1968 to nine in 2007 (with Israel, India, Pakistan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) joining the nuclear club) as proof of the failure of the NPT. However, some other scholars argue that the NPT has in fact been relatively effective in curbing proliferation. They note the dramatic decline in the number of nuclear weapons from around 80,000 in the late 1980s to less than half that number today and the fact that only four new states (three of which – Israel, India, Pakistan – have still not signed the NPT) have acquired nuclear weapons instead of nearly 20 states that some analysts had predicted. Indeed, several states, including Bulgaria, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain, did not pursue a nuclear weapons programme despite having the technical wherewithal to do so. In addition, other states, including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Egypt, Poland, Romania, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan and Yugoslavia which had nuclear weapons programmes during the Cold War eventually abandoned them. Similarly, Libya, which was suspected of having started a clandestine nuclear weapons programme at the end of the Cold War, terminated it in 2003. Moreover, in the post-Cold War period other states, including South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which possessed nuclear weapons also gave them up. Clearly, the NPT has been more successful in preventing new states from acquiring nuclear weapons than it has been in either slowing down or disarming states that already possess nuclear weapons. The latter objective is likely to be met only when nuclear weapons are decoupled from the present world order; an unlikely eventuality given the interest of nuclear weapons states in maintaining the status quo despite the current unipolar moment.
