ABSTRACT
This chapter seeks to reconstruct the various conceptual moves that permit Heidegger to deduce his Vor-Begriff of phenomenology. For Heidegger, intentionality is the essential structure of subjectivity qua Dasein. That is, mental experience is always directing itself towards its matters, it is always already outside, alongside and amidst things and not enclosed in what Heidegger calls “the cabinet of consciousness”. The intentionality thesis permits Heidegger to make the passage from Bewußtsein to Dasein in a reading of Husserl which, beneath the apparent generosity, ultimately works against Husserl’s intentions. The direction of Heidegger’s analysis of categorial intuition is similar to that of the discussion of intentionality. Heidegger approaches the doctrine of categorial intuition through an interesting, but rather loosely argued, discussion of the assertion or proposition. Phenomenology, as Heidegger tirelessly reminds us, is not the name of a philosophical movement or a past trend in the history of ideas, it is rather the permanent renewal of its own possibility as possibility.
