ABSTRACT
This paper explores Rousseau’s relationship to Leibniz in order to question the hermeneutic relevance of the concept of ‘theodicy’ as a characterization of Rousseau’s philosophy. In Section I, I examine Rousseau’s early reading of Leibniz and demonstrate that until 1755 Rousseau expressed little interest in Leibniz’s Theodicy. Section II discusses Rousseau’s exchange with Charles Bonnet on the Second Discourse’s compatibility with metaphysical optimism. Section III discusses why Rousseau’s apparent endorsement of Maupertuis’s argument in the Essai de philosophie morale leads to the reception of his Second Discourse as an Anti-Theodicy. Section IV sketches an interpretation of Rousseau’s 1756 Letter to Voltaire, in which he raises some striking paradoxes. In light of Rousseau’s claims in that letter, I contend that his genealogy bears much analogy with Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality and is at odds with any kind of metaphysical vindication of what is, or any rational justification of the existence of evil.
