chapter  28
Remuneration, Risk, and Financial Crisis
ByGUY W. FORD, TYRONE M. CARLIN, NIGEL FINCH
Pages 18

Th is role of inappropriate remuneration structures in the crisis has not been lost on various regulatory and industry bodies, many of whom have subsequently issued position statements on bank remuneration policies. Th e Basel committee of banking supervision announced proposed enhancements to the Basel II framework, which set the expectation that banks establish appropriate incentives throughout the fi rm to refl ect the long-term risks and rewards associated with their respective business models (Bank for International Settlements, 2009). Th e Australian Government, in consultation with the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority, announced that it would examine what domestic policy actions on executive remuneration would be appropriate to avoid excessive risk-taking in Australian fi nancial institutions, with focus on the structure of remuneration and the incentives built into such structures (Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority, 2008). Th e Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the United Kingdom states that the remuneration structure of fi rms “gave incentives for staff to pursue risky policies, undermining the impact of systems designed to control risk, to the detriment of shareholders and other stakeholders, including depositors, creditors and ultimately tax payers” (Financial Services Authority, 2008, p. 1). In a report on recommendations for market best practices, the Institute of International Finance (IIF) writes that market evolution related to the originate-to-distribute model and growth in structured products “led some fi rms to apply compensation incentives that exacerbated weaknesses that contributed to the market turmoil” (Institute of International Finance, 2008, p. 11). According to Baily et al. (2008), other bodies expressing similar views are the OECD (2008), the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group III (2008), and the Brookings Institution (2008).