ABSTRACT
In 1996 the ICAO Safety Oversight Programme became operational. This program is aimed at improving the efficacy with which governments ensure that international civil aviation activities for which they bear responsibility, are performed in compliance with the ICAO Standards for aviation safety.
There is a close link between aviation safety and quality, in the sense that quality can be regarded as a safety measure, providing prevention of incidents and accidents. By drawing a parallel between quality management and safety, it is shown that the ICAO Safety Oversight Programme is similar to a quality assurance approach to aviation safety oversight. The program uses the same approach as quality assurance by assessing the safety oversight organizations of Suites with regard to their functioning in several safety related areas. Based on the findings during these assessments, recommendations are generated which can be used as feedback into the assessed organization in order to correct for deficiencies and improve their efficacy. Similarly as in quality assurance audits, the assessments need to be performed in an open atmosphere in which there is no tendency to hide deficiencies. This is achieved by clearly presenting the program as a tool for the assessed organizations to be used for improving their own functioning: ICAO provides them with a mirror in which they can discover their own weaknesses so that they can improve themselves. A description is given of some general results of the ICAO Safety Oversight Programme as well as a discussion of its potential and of its possible future development The program, in spite of the necessary confidentiality of the reports, can be of great value lo improve safety oversight where that is necessary and can be very userul to induce mutual confidence between States in bilateral relations. The general results seem to indicate that there are major deficiencies with respect to safety oversight in many States. This confirms existing suspicions but at the same time oilers opportunities to improve global aviation safety. It is argued that this improvement requires a major effort in which small or underdeveloped States must be supported by more powerful States, which is very much in mutual interest.
The most important need to make the ICAO Safety Oversight Programme a success is support for follow-up activities. Lacking such support the program will fade out and disappear as a one time event into oblivion. However, with a positive response it might yield a much needed improvement of aviation safety.
