ABSTRACT
It is commonly asserted that the approaches and subject matters of the disciplines of economics and sociology intersect little, if at all, the former dedicating itself to the explanation of action that may be deemed rational, the latter clearing up the rest of the field in which action is supposedly somewhat less than rational and hence to be explained by other means, e.g., by appealing to norms or internalised values (see Samuelson, 1961:90).1 More recently, there has been a tendency for the ‘economic approach’ to encroach upon the sociological domain, something which can scarcely be described as an entente cordiale between the two disciplines.2 In this paper I highlight some of the inadequacies of the economic model of rationality, particularly its narrow, instrumental focus which deflects attention away from the indispensable role in action for normatively sanctioned interpretative schemas and expectancies. Rather than conceiving normatively guided action as a second-best alternative, either inferior, or in opposition, to its instrumentally rational counterpart, I show how the former is essential to the latter and how the two go very much together.
