chapter  3
The Varieties of Mood Intentionality
WithJonathan Mitchell
Pages 17

This chapter provides a philosophical account of the different ways moods—as personal-level experiential states—are intentional, where intentionality can be understood, minimally at first, as the way in which such a state is directed towards or ‘about’ something. Drawing on work in affective psychology, it aims to distinguish between two levels of mood experience: a first-order level (FOL) of phenomenal experience, and a second-order level (SOL), which consists in attention to aspects of the first-order experience. The chapter argues that the intentionality present at the FOL of mood experience is an immersed, non-propositional awareness of ‘the world’ and it is only at the SOL that moods can also become explicitly self-focused and bodily-focused. It focuses on moods as personal-level occurrent experiences, that is, personally and temporally indexed conscious episodes of varying duration, which are a familiar feature of most people’s affective psychology and which have a distinctive phenomenal character.