ABSTRACT
The subservient China of midcentury, with its aggressiveness dictated by Moscow, had replaced Russia as the primary source of Asia's turmoil. Mao Tse-tung's rise to power in China separated American officials, politicians, writers, and scholars on matters of causation and significance as had no previous external episode in the United States history. To the extent that a powerful minority of potential critics within the United States anticipated the Communist victory in China with deep regret, they regarded the new Chinese leaders as dangerous to Chinese traditions and to China's historical relations with the United States. United States officials, in attributing the Korean War to Soviet imperialism, placed enormous faith in China's decision to abstain. Such abstinence would demonstrate the actuality of Chinese independence. Even as the perception of China's Asian role changed during the 1950s, nonrecognition required perennial denial that the Peking regime represented the Chinese people.
