ABSTRACT
In the Agreements of 1954, the maximum levels agreed in 1952 were understood to be also minimum levels. On this basis, North Atlantic Alliance, in 1958, defined its requirements with respect to the German force contribution. The Army field forces had never more than 65 per cent of their required M-day personnel. In terms of quality this meant that none of the Army brigades was, strictly speaking, an M-day unit. The system of graduated operational readiness which was designed to minimise the weaknesses resulting from this brought no fundamental improvement of the situation. Organisational structures and command systems had to be adapted in good time to the technical stage of development of the 1980s. Many have voiced doubts as to whether a reduction in the strength of battalions and companies is advisable, and it does indeed appear that the proposed units are small for a system which does not practise unit replacement, since the slightest casualty incapacitates the unit.
