ABSTRACT
Deng's basic mistake, the one that Mao made before him, was that although he wished the Party to control the People's Liberation Army, he used the military to buttress his own power and enforce his own policy preferences—overriding the Party. Virtually all students of civil-military relations agree that the strength of civilian political institutions is the crucial determinant of the character of civil-military relations. A highly developed sense of military professionalism will inhibit an officer corps from expanding beyond its immediate concern with military defense, but strong civilian institutions are the only sure safeguard. In fall 1989, as European Communist regimes crumbled, military authorities in People's Republic of China coastal provinces expressed concern for the security of militia weapons-storage installations and instituted inspections and other protective measures. A reshuffle of Military Region commanders was due for the end of 1989, but was delayed until April-June 1990, evidently to avoid upsetting an already touchy situation.
