ABSTRACT
The Turkic nationalities merit special attention in a discussion of the Soviet “nationality problem,” because of the distinctive contribution they make in the field of foreign policy. Should the seeming tranquility of the Turkic segment of the “nationality front” be disrupted by the emergence of outspoken national dissidence and public protest, the Turkic nationalities would undoubtedly lose much of their value as foreign policy assets and could easily become net liabilities. Even if the nationality problem were to disappear from the diplomatic agenda, Soviet foreign policy would remain susceptible to its actual and potential influence. So long as foreign governments insist on keeping the nationality problem on the diplomatic agenda, however, the domestic pressures for a rectification of national grievances will be considerably harder to resist. The Turkic share of the country’s young and youthful population is even greater than its share of the whole and will remain so for the foreseeable future.
