ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that German anxieties about American initiatives are often premature. A retrospective look reveals that most of the initiatives were doomed by the very forces that created them. The chapter shows that American concerns about the implied inconsistencies are minimized by familiarity with the system. It describes two components of the US system that contain the contradictory impulses: the "study culture" and institutional diversity. Both have played a role in the development of initiatives and in differentiating German and US reactions. The fluid institutional interactions within the American security policy community are also a source of contradictory incentives. Perhaps the best illustration of this differing perspective arose with the recent Department of Defense study "Discriminate Deterrence". Treating Discriminate Deterrence as a major new American policy also failed to account for the institutional interest in the defense of Europe. Such institutional support is far more important than stimulus provided by even a popular president.
