ABSTRACT
In the last few years, accusations of parochialism and Western-centrism have grown rapidly in the global justice literature. Although coming from different sources, these accusations converge on the idea that current practices of global normative theorizing fail to respect the world’s moral and religious diversity. In response to these accusations, the advocates of strictly political conceptions of global justice can argue that, even if they do not promote diversity as a positive value, they acknowledge its reality and rely on justificatory practices that are neutral across moral and religious contexts. In so doing, they remain faithful to the original purpose of the political approach to justice, which was originally formulated by Rawls to overcome the problem posed by diversity for political justification. In this chapter, I put the political approach to the test by asking whether it is truly capable of accounting for the motivation that a person must have, independently of any commitment to a particular moral or religious doctrine, to endorse and promote a political conception of global justice.
