ABSTRACT
Russia–EU relations are overshadowed by the implications of the Ukrainian crisis and the ensuing reciprocal sanctions. Still, Russia is interested in ameliorating relations with the EU as a major trade and economic partner via establishing a “Greater Eurasia” – a geopolitical concept of continent-wide integration. In this context, Brexit is perceived in Russia as an internal EU–UK issue that will weaken the UK and possibly the EU. One of the latest crises in Russia–EU relations (the Skripal case) is interpreted as the UK’s desire to distract from its complicated talks with the EU and the UK’s fear over its deteriorating role in Europe after leaving the EU. With regard to the EU, Russian elites contemplate two scenarios: (1) a weakening of the EU, as Brexit might heighten Euroscepticism, thus diminishing the EU’s power to “lead by example”, or (2) an increased intra-European differentiation into “core” and “periphery”. To trace Russian perceptions of Brexit and the EU, this chapter focuses on three cohorts: Russian government decision-makers, opinion-making elites and the general public. The main research questions are: how did Russian elites and the public perceive the EU before the EU referendum in the UK? Have these perceptions changed over the period of uncertainty following the “Leave” vote, and, if so, in what way? How is Brexit perceived to have an impact on the EU’s image of a legitimate, credible and/or coherent actor?
