ABSTRACT
The role of truth in politics has become the subject of intense public and theoretical attention. The issue assumed gravity due to politically significant consequences of the recent deliberate misinformation in various political campaigns, a phenomenon now referred to as ‘post-truth’. The prevalent reaction to duplicity in politics typically assumes the form of a moralistic demand addressed to politicians that the requirements of truthfulness be observed. This chapter contends that the attitude, which deserves the name ‘alethic populism’, stems from a misconception of the nature of political activity, an error which is called the cognitocratic fallacy. Against this, the chapter stresses that the neologism ‘post-truth’ was originally intended to refer not to the deliberate lies of politicians but rather to the attitude of democratic citizenry who leniently acquiesces to them. The claim that postmodern philosophers are responsible for the abjuration of truth is disputed. In opposition to both the moralistic attitude of alethic populism and cognitocratic fallacy, this chapter argues that making sense of truth should be based on the concept of a cognitive regime understood as a set of rules variously regulating the usage of cognitive capabilities, as well as languages, in diverse spaces of human life.
