ABSTRACT
Though Indo-Chinese engagement at global forums began when they became founding members of the League of Nations and United Nations, the real engagement took place only when the People’s Republic of China occupied a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) permanent seat at United Nations and Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1971. However, in 1955, they came together through an Asia-Africa conference in Bandung (Indonesia) for framing the role of developing countries regarding the Cold War, economic development and decolonisation. But it couldn’t help them to enhance their relations and they went to war in 1962.
Relations between India and China only became reality when these countries went into the race of becoming the fastest growing economy after adopting economic liberation policy. There are other justifications for engagement such as taking a similar approach over different global issues, for example, climate change negotiations and WTO ministerial meetings (since 2001) in the 21st century. Meanwhile, they have taken initiatives to cooperate at global forums through creating the BRICS Bank and Asian Infrastructural Investment Bank (AIIB) to protest and demand for just economic order. However, these collaborations at different global forums (AIIB, SCO, BRICS, COP, climate change negotiations], etc.) have not explained the Chinese veto over India’s inclusion in the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) and UNSC. Further, this chapter seeks to explain the puzzle of ironic engagement of India and China at global forums, even though they are playing a major role together in formulating economic regimes with developed countries at the G-20 after the 2008 financial crisis but hesitating to cooperate in the UNSC and NSG.
