ABSTRACT
To understand changing Soviet perceptions of, and policies toward the regional conflict in southern Africa, they must be placed, not only within an appropriate time frame, but also within the context of changing Soviet perceptions of the Third World in general, and of Africa in particular. Even under Brezhnev, Africa south of the Sahara was viewed as the “soft underbelly of imperialism:” the most vulnerable of the three Third World continents, and the easiest to penetrate, with the lowest risks of confrontation, and the smallest economic burdens. Brezhnev had opted for the latter, whereas Gorbachev has chosen the former as the main thrust of Soviet effort for the coming decade. Gorbachev’s agenda is only partly inscribed, and his leadership represents, at best, an administration superimposed upon a system. The foundation of Gorbachev’s “new political thinking” is the priority of domestic interests over external interests, and the renunciation of ideological expansion in favor of internal development.
