ABSTRACT
This chapter addresses difficulties in reconciling Spinoza’s non-teleological, naturalistic account of the affects with the kind of salvation he advances through adequate knowledge. It examines his controversial definition of the mind and its mode of union with the body, focusing in particular on the roles given to the passions and body-dependent affectivity, on the one hand, and to consciousness and reason, respectively, in the process of emancipation from their bondage, on the other hand. It argues that rational activity is more important than consciousness in Spinoza’s account of the human mind and the ways of perfecting it, and that while his strong commitment to rationality sets his philosophical psychology widely apart from other forms of modern naturalism, it is not exclusively intellectualist. Qua idea, our mind strives to increase its own power of thinking or understanding and thereby its share in the infinite intellect of God. Qua idea of an actually existing body, the mind’s first and principal striving is to affirm the body’s existence, of which it is conscious only by sensing or imagining its affections. To make Spinoza’s moral psychology consistent with his ethical goals, his naturalism is best read along Aristotelian lines as stressing, besides the perfection of the intellect, the practical role of reason and rational action for self-preservation and improvement.
