ABSTRACT

The control of corporate criminality has gained a significant profile within the UK legislative landscape. Despite claims to be a global leader in its prevention, cases of grand commercial corruption within leading British corporations have shown that the temptations of illicit activity remain high, with bribery all too easily used to obtain and retain business. Limited governmental resources have driven a change in policy – one which proclaims stronger regulation and enforcement – via policies of self-regulation. However, a regulatory paradox has come to exist given the cases showing a remaining inability of this methodology to challenge wrongdoing due to ambiguities and contradictions offered by the self-regulatory environment. The capabilities of corporations have enabled them to engage in corrupt activity and to arguably pay their way out of a conviction. The result is an ethically laden temptation: does the reward of success outweigh the cost of punishment? The challenge remains in how the growth of laissez-faire, self-regulatory practices can be used to better effect.