ABSTRACT
The language of “virtue” is popular today in religious ethics and theology, interestingly more so than in contemporary philosophy or political theory. But we would do well to recall that Reinhold Niebuhr worried about a too-earnest use of a language of virtue. Niebuhr knew what few theologians and ethicists today seem to grasp, namely that “virtue” is not innocent of limitations or dangers, among which is a dangerous tendency towards self-complacency and bourgeois stultification, and a propensity to shield oneself and one’s community from radical critique. Furthermore, “virtue” relies too much on the immanent energies of human agency and not enough on the transcendent sources of that agency and autonomous forces beyond human agency itself; this is especially true in situations of public action, where action was obligatory but with effects that were substantially beyond our control. This chapter elucidates Niebuhr’s worries about the language of virtue and contextualizes them in his larger, if only partially elaborated, effort to situate the human moral project within an essentially ironic frame. This helps us better understand Niebuhr’s own agenda and offers helpful, if perhaps not altogether welcome, insights for religious ethics and theology today.
