ABSTRACT

This chapter describes changes in the international and regional distribution of power that opened the door to Arab-Israeli diplomacy. It addresses the Oslo agreements and some of the specific reasons why the Israeli-Palestinian process failed. The chapter considers the tenures of Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak, the failed Camp David summit, and the Clinton Plan and final talks at Taba, Egypt, in January 2001. It also considers some broader explanations for why Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian talks never led to peace agreements. In 1991, the George W. Bush administration capitalized on major changes in regional and world politics to jump-start the peace process at Madrid. But Israeli-Palestinian agreements collapsed in violence despite enormous US investments in the peace process. The chapter shows that political and procedural factors, not conflicting objectives or violent opposition, best explain the failures. The violence was greatly damaging, but leaders need to anticipate it and minimize the damage to the political process.