ABSTRACT
According to objectivism, the reasons for which we act are facts or states of affairs rather than the mental states causing our actions, as Davidsonian psychologism cum causalism claims. This paper explores whether a version of causalism can be saved by giving up psychologism and endorsing objectivism, so that the reasons for which we act are the normative reasons that cause our corresponding actions. We address two problems for “objecto-causalism”. First, in cases in which the agent mistakenly takes a fact to obtain, we still explain her action by appeal to what she takes to be the case, which cannot have caused the action. Second, future facts may be reasons for which the agent acts, yet they cannot be causes of her current actions. In order to resolve these problems, we move from objecto-causalism to “objecto-capacitism”, which appeals to agential competences manifested in acting for a reason. We briefly explore connections with the philosophy of history. Even historical explanations which appeal to the reasons of individual agents are causal in the wide sense of invoking causal factors that have made a difference to how historical events unfolded.
