ABSTRACT
This chapter presents an attempt to go some way toward such an understanding. It offers a brief comparison of Bolzanian and Brentanian views on representation and judgement. A brief survey of Brentano's main positions is informative as a theoretical point of comparison for Bolzano's own views. When it comes to 19th-century contributions to the philosophy of mind, there is little doubt that many influential theories, just like Bolzano who lived in Prague most of his life, came from Austria – or more precisely: the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The methods and approach at play in Brentano's seminal Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint were arguably neither psychological in the sense in which we understand the term today, nor indeed genuinely empirical. Bolzano's theories ultimately provide their basis to Twardwoski's seminal criticisms of Brentano's theory of intentionality is both ironic and somewhat perplexing.
