ABSTRACT

After having elaborately defended his Kantian Argument, Parfit attempts to intricately weave together two distinct threads—Kant’s Contractualism and Scanlon’s Contractualism—into one. He calls this the Convergence Argument. And then Parfit attempts to intricately weave together three distinct threads: Kant’s Contractualism and Scanlon’s Contractualism with a third theory, namely, Rule Consequentialism, into one. He calls this the Triple Theory. Parfit’s Convergence Argument is presented and examined. Next, Parfit’s Triple Theory is stated and evaluated; it is shown that both the Convergence Argument and the Triple Theory face considerable obstacles.

A moral theory, says Scanlon, can be top-down or bottom-up. Quite roughly, a top-down theory takes the fundamental principle (say, the Categorical Imperative or Parfit’s UA-optimific principle) as governing the particular reasons an agent can have insofar as he is rational, and it (the principle) determines what the agent ought to do. On the other hand, emphasizing the richness of our reasons and their varied, context-dependent relative-strengths, a bottom-up theory begins with particular reasons an agent can have insofar as he is rational, and these determine what the agent ought to do. Barbara Herman’s work, which exemplifies and defends Kant’s top-down moral theory, is invoked. Scanlon’s theory instantiates a bottom-up moral theory. In order to constitute an interesting difference, these two moral theories—Kant’s top-down theory and Scanlon’s bottom-up theory—must be non-equivalent. It is argued that since Parfit makes an essential use of both types of moral theory in his cardinal argument, he cannot have them be non-equivalent because otherwise his argument would necessarily falter. And so Parfit must refashion these two theories and make them at least roughly equivalent; and so, indeed, Parfit does. But, it is argued, Parfit refashions these two theories in a manner—in a consequentialist manner—that defeats his Ultimate Derivation thesis.