ABSTRACT
As a step toward establishing a key component of his fundamental argument for the Ultimate Derivation, Parfit offers analysis, criticism, reformulation, and defense of a version of Kantian Contractualism. The primary task in this chapter is to show that Kant’s contractualism, even duly reformulated—indeed, especially because of that—may not best serve Parfit’s cause. To appreciate the full force of Parfit’s argument (and the counterarguments), Parfit’s arguments against Rawls’s Moral Contractualism is sketched and Rawls is defended in part. These deficiencies in Rawls’s Moral Contractualism leads Parfit to formulate a version of Kantian Contractualism—highlighting a different view of reasons and rationality. Parfit believes that Kantian Contractualism avoids the problems faced by Rawls’s Moral Contractualism and is a significant advance over it. It is argued that Kantian Contractualism, as Parfit delineates it, faces quite a few hurdles, not the least of it being its connection with consequentialism. The pivotal Uniqueness Condition connected to the Kantian Contractualist Formula is carefully examined. It is argued that, contrary to Parfit’s claim, the Uniqueness Condition will frequently fail to be satisfied.
