ABSTRACT
The treatment of specific intent crimes, particularly with respect to genocide, is one of the most controversial aspects of superior responsibility. This study examines the interaction between genocidal intent and a superior’s omission/failure to prevent or punish crimes committed by the subordinates. In applying superior responsibility to the crime of genocide, there is a debate whether the superior must himself have the necessary genocidal intent, or if he must merely know that his subordinates possessed a genocidal intent. The divergent approaches demonstrated in the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia case law gives rise to a rather ambiguous findings. This chapter presents the importance of defining the nature of superior responsibility, and demonstrates how different perception of superior responsibility could offer a solution to the treatment of special-intent crimes. Superior responsibility and special intent of genocide are well defined by international criminal tribunals and are often the subjects of discussion between academics. However, the unique relationship between superior responsibility and special-intent crimes has not been yet analysed in a sufficiently comprehensive and complex manner. This study offers an analysis of the relationship between superior responsibility and genocide as a special-intent crime, focusing on the concept of superior responsibility and its nature.
