Darwin, Duties, and the Demiurge
This chapter presents an Evolutionary Debunking Argument (EDA) against Wielenberg's position. If there's no God, and evolution is true, then why think our human cognitive faculties would instantiate moral properties and moral rights? In such a scenario our cognitive faculties would merely be adaptations nature “selected” for because they led to greater chances of survival or reproduction. There's no good reason to think these adaptions are more morally valuable than other randomly generated adaptions. In addition, even if there are objective moral truths, since evolution selects for “fit” behavior, not true beliefs, there's no good reason to think the evolutionary process would've resulted in us having true beliefs about objective morality. Lastly, Linville criticizes Wielenberg's Platonism by drawing arguments from a similar debate in history between Bertrand Russell and George Santayana.