ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on Arendt’s philosophical analysis of totalitarianism. I argue that, due to her decision to focus on totalitarianism as a structure, and the challenge its “horrible originality” poses to our available grammars and criteria for judgement, Arendt’s approach is a very good example of the way in which philosophical critique can contribute to the interruption of extreme forms of historical violence. I first show the relevance of Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism as a philosophical—and not only a historical political—problem, and how this allows her to present totalitarianism as a structure that survives the specificity of its historical appearance and permeates our current political and historical categories. I then show how this structural character of totalitarianism comes to be revealed in a clear way in Arendt’s analysis of the camps understood as a crystallization of the logic underlying totalitarianism. Finally, I show how, by making visible the meanings of totalitarianism (both the ways in which it becomes intelligible and the radical new meanings that it has introduced), Arendt’s philosophical analysis evinces the need for the creation of new grammars that enable us to listen to these meanings and make them audible and intelligible for critique.
