ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that while the attempt to democratize the procedure for discovering appropriate norms is a welcome development in theories of justice, Jurgen Habermas nevertheless fails to provide a normatively and practically compelling solution to the problem of motivation. It focuses on the role of substantive justice in realizing the ideal speech situation which is central to Habermas’ theory. The chapter interrogates Habermas’ move away from citizen-centered discourses to more impersonal discourses and his move to rely on a legal system with sanctions for noncompliance as a strategy to unburden citizens of motivational concerns altogether. It then indicates why participatory, deliberative citizenship is necessary to solve the problems of motivation and political stability. The chapter also offers suggestions for institutional design and reform that may facilitate the development of citizens’ deliberative capacities and democratic commitments and thereby offer a solution to the problem of motivation which is compatible with Habermas’ radical democratic ideal.
