ABSTRACT
The term “monad” has a possibly irreducible metaphysical flavor. The concept of monad is particularly fitting, because it allows Husserl also to express the non-properly objectified life of a subject, without dispelling its reference to something else than itself. More precisely, the concept of monad becomes a device to account for the concrete, let's plainly say empirical, subjects, by considering all of their "stuffing," summarily. Only a monadic account of subjectivity, which in the end in Husserl's thought kept as the ultimate forum of fundamental evidence, enables the execution of the "universal calculus" of objectivity. In the end, the monadological approach to subjectivity, perhaps quite surprisingly, commits us not to keep isolated in an outwardly self-referential, and self-guarded, phenomenological realm, but rather to enter the philosophical agora as such, where everyone is by right a monad with an inner phenomenological domain, regardless of their tribal membership.
