ABSTRACT
In adopting social science’s spectator’s view of society, together with its prioritizing of positive description and explanation and its wariness of normativity, it is easy to overlook the fact that life is normative; we are evaluative beings – beings whose relation to the world is one of concern. We not only act and make sense of things but continually evaluate how things we care about – including our own well-being – are faring, and often wonder what to do for the best. Perhaps most importantly, we continually assess how we and others are being treated; even though we may be predominantly self-absorbed, we often act towards others, or at least certain others, with regard to their well-being; for example, showing them respect (Filonowicz, 2008; Smith, 1984 [1759]). Social life would be unimaginable without at least some such behaviour. Moral – and immoral – sentiments such as compassion, shame, resentment at injustice, guilt and contempt can loom large in people’s lives, and they are frequently prompted by inequalities and domination. But as I shall argue, these are not merely ‘feelings’ or ‘affect’, but assessments of the import of certain social circumstances. To ignore the import that things – particularly social interactions – may have for people is to produce a bland, alienated account of social life.
