ABSTRACT
One model of Church-state relations is the theocracy where Church and state are virtually unified into an undifferentiated entity, and the nation’s religious leader acts as the sole political authority. Communist societies similarly, exemplify the case where power is centralized in one location, the all-powerful state, and the Church is nothing but an appendage of the state machinery (Stan and Turcescu 2000). Another model, epitomized by the United States, is the separation of Church and state enshrined in the nation’s constitution. Ideologically the Church and state make no attempt to control each other, although in practice this arrangement has sometimes been challenged (Hamburger 2002). These two models are at best ideal types though, with the reality of Church-state relations often lying on a continuum (Tamney and Johnson 1987). In many Asian societies, the intricate interplay between religion and politics has been the hallmark of government (Leung and Chan 2003). Here clergy and politicians sometimes engage in unholy alliances to guarantee each other’s interests, while at other times, as in the case of the 2007 uprisings in Myanmar, the religious elite operate independently to the detriment of current political arrangements, to bring about needed social change. Although forms of Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism have a long history in
many Asian societies, having had at least some political control in the past, Christianity has a much more recent history in Asia. While Christianity possibly arrived in the southern tip of India as early as the first century, and in parts of China through Nestorian preachers in the sixth century, it did not have a strong following until the last few centuries through Western colonial activity (Moffett 1998). Western powers arriving in Asia were primarily concerned with economic expansionist interests, but were also sometimes interested in civilizing these societies through converting the population to Christianity. Apart from the Philippines, where the vast majority of the population embrace Roman Catholicism, in most parts of Asia, Christianity is held by a minority of the population (Freston 2001). Despite their small representation within Asian populations, Christianity has had a significant effect on societal dynamics. Christian clergy in Hong Kong, for instance, were among the most vocal religious authorities to demand freedom for religious
expression from China and later to take state authorities in both the mainland and the Special Administrative Region (SAR) to task for various social injustices inflicted on vulnerable groups (Leung and Chan 2003). Similarly, Taiwanese Presbyterians have been powerful advocates for nationhood, going against sentiments for reunification with the People’s Republic of China (Rubinstein 2003). One way of conceptualizing Church-state relations in Asia is using the
notion of the patron-client relationship (Leung and Chan 2003). In discussing the case of Church-state relations in colonial Hong Kong, I use Walder’s (1986: 22-25) definition to point out that in such relationships, the patron has a monopoly over vital resources, having ownership and control to distribute these resources. Clients in turn pledge their allegiance to the patron with the hope that they will be able to share in the resources. Leung and Chan (2003) argue that in colonial Hong Kong, the Christian church was dependent on the state for financial resources crucial for its survival, and the state supplied this in the form of generous aid for it to run educational and social service institutions. Being such a contractor in a dependent relationship, the institutional church was essentially curbed from raising issues with the state, something only a few daring and outspoken clergy were willing to do and then risk censure by the Church. In the discussion by Leung and Chan (2003), it is evident that they view client-patron relationships as essentially dependence relationships. Suggestive of this point is an earlier article by Leung (2001), where she argues that if the Hong Kong church does not restructure itself before it reverts to Chinese rule, then it will become a client in a client-patron relationship rather than being accorded partner status. However, client-patron relationships need not necessarily be seen as
dependent relationships. Scott (1972), in discussing client-patron relationships in Southeast Asian societies, argues that there are observable variations in such relationships based on differences in the relative strengths of the patron and the client. Clients who have their own resource base and are therefore not dependent on the patron may be best deemed as strong clients who may greatly reduce the power of the patron. This then allows us to distinguish between different patron-client dyads. Notwithstanding the definitions used to understand client-patron relation-
ships, it is evident that relationships between Church and state follow a continuum from relationships of dependency to those which resemble partnerships. While the form of dependent patron-client relationship may have some applicability when applied to Church-state relations in Asia as the case of Hong Kong shows, where the Church is weak and requires the support of the state for its survival, its applicability may be limited. This is particularly the case where the Church is constantly growing and able to attract a broad base of society including those from the upper and elite classes. I argue that in such a case, as in Singapore and in other Asian societies such as Indonesia and South Korea where Christianity is growing substantially, models of Church-state relationships need to recognize the increasing
position and power of the Church. Accommodation then becomes the hallmark of such relationships. Gill (1998), in considering such accommodation in the context of Church-state relationships, notes the ongoing exchange between institutions that both parties must view as equitable bargains in their ultimate goals for survival. State officials, in their desire to minimize the cost of ruling, especially in obtaining a compliant citizenry, view the Church as a possible source of ideological support. Since churches have a special role in providing norms and values for their congregations, having ideologies wrapped in supernatural beliefs that secular ideologies cannot possess, they offer an important support to legitimize the presence of the state and its agenda. Christian theology, as found in the pages of the New Testament, encourages loyalty to state officials citing that they are God’s agents whose ultimate goal is to be a terror to those who are evil.1 However, church officials require the assistance of the state both in providing it with sufficient protection from possible opponents of the Christian faith and for resources to expand its influence within society. In this chapter, I focus on the case of Church-state relations in Singapore
by focusing on the accommodation that occurs between both parties in this relationship. While a comprehensive examination of this relationship should consider both the Protestant and Roman Catholic section of the Church, I confine my examination to the Protestant Church, since the dynamics of the relationship are possibly different. I show that, while the strong and interventionist Singaporean state tries to gain greater control over religion, the Church has not become a puppet in its hands, having its arms tied from engaging in action independent of the state. Rather the Christian church has interests and goals which are not derived from the state, although many are congruent with state interests. This combination then makes it possible for both Church and state to accommodate one another to achieve the much needed support of the other. As part of its strategy for accommodation, the Christian church accedes to various state demands that do not impede on its fundamental mission, so as to obtain other concessions vital for its survival. To better understand the dynamics of this accommodating relationship between Church and state, I first discuss the nature of the state and its attempts to control religion. I then discuss the nature of Singaporean Christianity, particularly its conservative nature. I then point out the areas of tension between these two entities, through showing how and why accommodation has become necessary. Central in the administrative philosophy of the Singaporean state is prag-
matism (Chua 1995). Here, decisions are not made based on ideals but upon practical considerations, one being the political survival of the party that has ruled virtually unchallenged since independence. The state has maintained its legitimacy by ensuring a stable economy and the peaceful co-existence of different races and religious groups, which constitute this multi-racial and multi-religious population. To ensure economic well being, the state values economic development, even if there is some compromise on formerly
cherished moral principles. This is evident in the recent relaxing of various legislations. Bar-top dancing, late closing hours at night spots, the setting up of casinos and the hiring of homosexuals in the public service, all anathemas in former years but now accepted as new norms crucial to the creation of a society conducive to global talent, often cited by state officials as crucial for economic progress (Tan 2003; Lee 2007). On its other important pursuit of maintaining a peaceful nation state, the state is committed to ensuring the ethnic and religious balance of the nation (Giok 2005). While it keeps ethnic balances by ensuring a proportional stream of migrants from China and India, and ensuring that the main racial groups have proportional representation in parliament (Yap 1993), ensuring a religious balance has been more difficult, particularly with evangelistically oriented Christians. This, for instance, prompted the state in the late 1980s not only to carefully study the phenomenon of conversion but also seek ways to help encourage other religions to compete better in the religious economy (Kuah-Pearce 2003). The state, which has a reputation for micro-managing and wielding high
levels of control in practically every facet of life, is keen to gain substantial control over religion (Tamney 1996; Hill 2004). This is because religion is an important priority for a majority of the population, despite the high levels of modernization present in the city-state (Pereira 2005). Based on the most recent census data, Buddhists comprise 42.5 per cent followed by Muslims and those of no religious affiliation constituting 14.9 percent and 14.8 percent respectively. Christians make up 14.6 per cent while Taoists 8.5 per cent and Hindus 4.0 per cent. The religions that have shown marked growth – Christianity, since the 1980s, and Buddhism in more recent years – have been able to present a rational version of religion appealing to the increasingly educated population in Singapore (Tong 2007). Christianity, which has been growing in popularity among the better educated Chinese, has resulted in Christians ‘exerting an influence, politically, socially and economically, far greater than the number they represent in the population’ (Kuo, Quah and Tong 1988: 11). Considering the educated population of religious adherents, it is not sur-
prising that the most significant showdown with religion was in the 1980s with a well-educated group of professionals, religious workers and priests associated with the Roman Catholic Church who were supposedly espousing liberation theology, an ideology which legitimated armed struggle to ensure social justice. The Marxist conspiracy as it was called, saw the detention of this group under the Internal Security Act that allowed indefinite detention without trial, since it was reasoned that the evidence used to incriminate the individuals would not be sufficiently rigorous for the courts (Rerceretnam 2006). At the beginning of the conspiracy, the Roman Catholic Church rejected the state’s allegations, voiced its discontent with the state’s actions and appealed for the release from detention of those who were supposedly innocent. Since this event, the state has increased its attempts to control religion, noting its power to destabilize political regimes. The Maintenance of Religious Harmony bill, passed in 1990, clearly spells out that religious clergy
and institutions must stay out of the political arena (Sinha 2005). Furthermore, religious institutions are responsible for maintaining the peaceful coexistence of religious groups existing on the island. They thus must ensure that insensitive acts or statements, which may cause religious tension, are avoided. The state machinery is given ample powers to bar errant clergy who flout such regulations from preaching and if such a restriction is not successful, to introduce more stringent penalties. As far as the functionalist state is concerned, religion has a place in society. In the words of the then Minister of Community Development, Abdullah Tarmugi, making his keynote address on World Religion Day, religious bodies should focus on how they could ‘contribute to community bonding and community development’ (Tarmugi 1998). On describing the nature of Christianity in Singapore, the Protestant seg-
ment is best described as conservative2 (Mathew 2006; Wong 2000). This form of Christianity, as opposed to the more liberal form, prides itself on its strong commitment to preserve fundamental tenets of faith, particularly a belief in the literal interpretation of Scripture (Bartkowski 1996; Woodberry and Smith 1998). Such readings call for accepting the uniqueness and exclusivity of the Christian gospel, shunning any attempt to compromise this exclusivity. Because conservative Christianity views eternal salvation as only within the reach of those who profess and follow Christianity, there is an evangelistic fervour to direct as many people to the ranks of the saved before it is too late. The Church thus takes pains to ensure that its market share within the religious economy is growing, an indication that it is heeding the divine mandate to reach as many people as possible with the Christian message (Hunter 1987). Besides being evangelistic, the conservative nature of Christianity is concerned with the evils of society, especially those which distract both its constituents and society at large from moral purity. Unlike liberal theologies, which are focused on reducing inequality and ensuring a just system that provides freedom, conservative Christianity champions morality. Thus, the preservation of traditional family values such as heterosexuality, marriage between a male and female, and the curbing of immorality whether it is promiscuity, pornography or prostitution is high on the agenda (McConkey 2001). In more recent years, as part of a global push among conservative Christians worldwide, the leadership of conservative churches locally have been forced to champion moral purity and not remain silent. This has led to the Church increasingly identifying its role as a moral conscience to society (Mathew 2009). It is evident that the concern of the Christian church, which rests on the
preservation of certain ideals, will inevitably create tension for a state focused on pragmatism. The debates surrounding the setting up of casinos in Singapore and the liberalization of policies pertaining to homosexuality in the public sphere saw very active participation by the church. This then demonstrates how the conservative church is attempting to live out its vision to be a moral conscience to the state (Mathew 2009). This, however, creates tension for a state that has been wary of being challenged about its plans. Actually,
secular civil society groups have sometimes come under criticism from the government and been relegated to pressure groups when they have launched criticisms at the state (Rerceretnam 2006). While the Church sometimes seems to be a hindrance to the pursuits of the
state, the state is careful not to marginalize the Church. The state recognizes how much it benefits from an active Christianity, particularly in its ability to contribute to quality social service provision. As early as the founding of Singapore, the British representative of the East India Company, Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, though not caring for much missionary involvement during his early term on the island, citing that he found little religious virtue in Christianity compared to the other Asian religions he encountered on the island, became an avid supporter of Christian missionary activity later because of his belief that Christianity could bring needed educational progress to the Singaporean population (Sng 2003). With his open door policies towards missionaries, a number of them opened up not only educational institutions but also orphanages and hospitals. Christian missionaries were the first to establish facilities for counselling provision, crisis care, education for those who were intellectually disabled and drug rehabilitation (Mathew 2008a). At present, based on a count of Singaporean voluntary welfare organizations, those that are affiliated to Protestant Christian churches and denominations comprise 41 per cent of the total number of such organizations, a significant portion of the sector (Mathew 2008a). The state’s interest in getting Christian involvement in social service provi-
sion stems from the consideration that Christian organizations have large congregations that can be mobilized for various community causes. The state, which has always opposed a welfare system, encourages the population to share the burden of the community (Mendes 2007). The Christian church, which is largely middle class with many having better occupations than the rest of the population, is seen as a group that is more than capable of volunteering and giving for such community needs (Kuo, Quah and Tong 1988). The state also prefers to channel its budget for community improvement to social service agencies that can assist in providing help and services to those who need them, rather than building a bureaucracy to tends to welfare needs. This is because a state bureaucracy tasked with ensuring welfare may not have the needed passion to engage in such tasks. As articulated by the Minister of Community, Youth and Sports, Dr Vivian Balakrishnan:
… we want commitment, we want passion, we want dedication. We want people whose hearts and minds are truly resonating and in sync with the people they are trying to help. Hearts and minds like that cannot be bought, cannot be employed.
