ABSTRACT

Tajikistan is interesting in the context of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) for a number of reasons. First, Tajikistan is a success story: over a decade after the formal end to fighting Tajikistan now enjoys remarkable levels of peace and stability. Second, DDR programmes in Tajikistan were accompanied by a comprehensive peace settlement, which called for tough compromises from the two main parties to the conflict. Third, there was an emphasis on reintegration over demobilisation and disarmament. Whole units of anti-government forces were included into state military and police structures, while opposition leaders were given 30 per cent of the top government posts. Given the full-scale integration of opposition units into the government forces, demobilisation was in some ways partial. There were degrees of disarmament of fighters but large weapons stocks remained with commanders and little pressure was levied on medium-and top-level leaders to surrender their weapons. Last, a striking feature of Tajikistan’s peace settlement is the set of measures taken by the reconciled parties that helped deter the emergence of spoilers. This chapter argues that reintegration was prioritised over demobilisation and disarmament in Tajikistan’s peace process. The decision of the participants and sponsors of the peace agreement to overlook inadequate disarmament rates created comparatively high levels of trust among the former fighters and commanders. The quick provision of incentives, such as comprehensive amnesties and the offer of government positions and economic assets, also created stakes in the peace process for a number of actors. Transitional justice was largely overlooked. A central claim of this chapter is that the DDR process in Tajikistan, and its eventual success, run counter to the conventional wisdom on what components should form part of DDR and how the process is best implemented. Robert Muggah notes that ‘a post-conflict reconstruction orthodoxy’ has emerged, which stipulates particular types and sequencing of peacebuilding efforts and DDR activities.2 The case of Tajikistan runs counter both to the emphasis on ‘positive peace’ and political liberalisation in conventional approaches to peacebuilding as well as to the stress on demobilisation and disarmament.3