ABSTRACT
As in the case of many programmes related to security-sector reform (SSR), there is widespread consensus that the implementation of disarmament and demobilisation in Afghanistan faced multiple contradictions. For example, there was conflict over the ownership of a programme demanded and designed by external actors but which required a high degree of participation by locals. Another contradiction was between the humanitarian concerns of some implementing partners (the welfare of the ex-combatants) and the political interests of those Afghan and international actors who were mainly concerned with maintaining good relations with the military class controlling the Afghan countryside. Finally, the bureaucratic definition of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration as developed by the implementing agencies did not match the much more complex reality on the ground. This chapter argues that while the tension between diverging interests was real, the contradictions were eventually resolved. Frustrated middle rank officials of international organisations and diplomatic corps often continued to work on the assumption that SSR was still proceeding as planned. Through a sometimesharsh confrontation,1 the political leaderships concerned worked out an unofficial compromise on disarmament and demobilisation. This compromise involved the establishment of a façade process of disarmament, which throughout this chapter will be referred to as DDR and DIAG (Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups).2
