ABSTRACT
Emboldened by the repeated fruitful application of such methods and basing themselves on a track record of major “successes” – ranging from the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan to the reorientation of U.S. foreign policy in reaction to the “raids” of September 11 – jihadist ideologues and strategists have developed their understanding of their current state of affairs to place it in the context of a global war aimed at the creation of the universal khilafa state. While the assertion of this goal is often relegated to jihadi treatises, and while the pronouncements of jihadi leaders have largely concentrated on concrete “crossover” grievances with the potential of resonating in non-jihadi Muslim circles – such as the presence of non-Muslim forces in Arabia, the Western occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the perennial question of Palestine – the global ambitions of the jihadi movement have remained a consistent factor in its decisionmaking process. They have also shaped its own assessment and presentation of the current state of jihad, and, arguably, have exposed its weaknesses and led it to serious setbacks in more than one locale.
