ABSTRACT
In many ways, Hillel and Shammai, and the ‘Houses’ they established, can be considered the beginning of what we call ‘the world of the Sages.’1 The halakhic traditions of the House of Hillel and the House of Shammai constitute the earliest and most fundamental layer of the Tannaitic literature — indeed, of the Rabbinic literature in general.2 The Houses of Hillel and Shammai are presented in the sources as distinct jurisprudential schools of thought upholding different opinions as to the law (halakha), and, less frequently, lore (Aggada). But what was the essential nature of these ‘Houses,’ and what engendered such pervasive and systematic controversy between them? In this article I will argue that the two Houses are distinct ‘schools’ not only insofar as their legal-halakhic thinking is concerned, but also in terms of their very approach to study. Indeed, the two are distinct academies (batei midrash) characterized by distinctive approaches to learning. My goal is to describe — to the extent that the sources allow this — the organizational structures, pedagogic methods, and views of the two Houses qua both halakhic schools of thought, and academic institutions. Focusing on their views as to tradition and reason as sources of knowledge
* Haim Shapira teaches at Bar-Ilan University’s Faculty of Law. 1 This was apparent to the Sages themselves, not only to the external
observer. E.g., Hillel and Shammai are called “the fathers of the world” (mEduyot 1:4); cf. Ben-Sira 44:1. Also tEduyot 1:1 “When the Sages assembled in the vineyard of Yavneh they said: a time will come when someone will seek a dictum of the Torah, and will not find it, a dictum of the Soferim, and will not find it. . . . They said: Let us begin from Hillel and Shammai” (Zuckermandel edition, p. 454).
