ABSTRACT
In most respects, the NATO enlargement debate seems to be over. The fear that enlargement was going to be dangerous, premature, or, at least, irrelevant1 does not appear to have been borne out. In two enlargements, in 1999 and in 2004, NATO has added ten new members, including the three newly independent Baltic States, and has signifi cantly expanded the “zone of democracy.” Russia has acquiesced to these enlargements and, in fact, has joined the NATO-Russia Council which, in turn, has promised to provide a powerful institutional consultative mechanism and allows for senior Russian military representation at Alliance headquarters. NATO for its part has moved to broaden its political role and greatly widened the geographical scope of its missions, including the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), in Afghanistan.2 In fact, the Alliance has developed an increasingly global view.3 Further, the Alliance not only remains committed to additional enlargement, but several states, including Georgia and Ukraine (at least, many of their leaders), are clamoring to join.4 Last, Russia, with the bloody exception of Chechnya, seems politically stable, awash in oil at a time of record world energy prices, and is enjoying impressive economic growth. Thus, most of the pivots for a reassuring and sustainable security architecture from Vancouver to Vladivostok seem to be in place.
