ABSTRACT

The extent to which international institutions bring about change in the domestic systems of states has long been a matter of inquiry. The academic literature has burgeoned since the end of the Cold War to match and even overtake the examples of multilateral involvement and intervention. It has ranged from the general to the particular, with the role of the EU a frequent focus of study (see for example the issue of International Organization, Fall 2005). Yet while there is widespread agreement that institutions such as the EU can and do play a role, the weight and importance to be attached to them varies. On the one hand, much, inevitably, depends on the international context itself as well as the nature of the international institution. On the other hand, central, too, are the circumstances of the target state – whether it is failing, frail, rogue-ish, or post-conflict – and the obduracy or responsiveness of its authorities, the strength and capacities of its domestic institutions, its economy, its geo-strategic position and its conceptions of itself. Moreover, the debate has taken place at a variety of different levels, pitching, for example, positivists against constructivists. Whereas the former might focus on the strategic assessment of costs and benefits and whether incentives outweigh the costs of standing out or defecting, the latter have explored less tangible issues such as identities, norms and cultural practices. There have also been further divisions between enforcement theorists and management theorists, the former focusing more on coercive strategies undertaken by the international institution, the latter on social learning and capacity building (Tallberg 2002). For their part, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) have pointed to the diverse roles of norm entrepreneurs in bringing about change – not least in holding actors responsible for their violations.