ABSTRACT
This chapter is based on the premise that institutional reform and the absence thereof are revealing about the effects of institutional design on outcomes, or at least how governments perceive these effects to be. In the past fifteen years, we have witnessed major institutional reforms and innovations in the international arena. The EU broadened, deepened, and moved increasingly towards a supranational decision-making structure. NATO accepted ten new member states and modernized its military command structure. The international trade system was transformed fundamentally by the replacement of GATT with the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its highly legalized dispute-resolution mechanism. The World Bank responded to pressure by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and others to formally incorporate environmental issues into their decision-making procedures (Nielson and Tierney 2003). And, the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Kyoto Protocol, while not embraced universally, signal that there is considerable appetite in many parts of the globe for new and extended institutional solutions to global issues.
