ABSTRACT
As indicated by Huse (2005), expectations regarding specific board tasks are dependent upon the attributes and perspectives of the actors who are involved in the firm. Because of the special relationships between the actors and the fact that they typically occupy multiple positions within the firm, family firms constitute a unique organizational setting in which to examine board tasks. Family firms can be defined as firms in which a family has sufficient involvement in ownership and management to determine the vision of that firm in a way that is consistent with family preferences (Chua, Chrisman and Sharma, 1999). These firms represent the predominant organizational form throughout the world and are large contributors to economic welfare (IFERA, 2003; Tagiuri and Davis, 1996). The purpose of this study is to advance our understanding of the board’s control tasks in a family firm context. More specifically, we provide an overview of agency problems that are likely to arise in family firms, and present exploratory empirical evidence concerning the involvement of family firm boards in controlling the management team and how this involvement is influenced by the generational phase of the firm.
