ABSTRACT
In 1966, President Charles de Gaulle took French forces out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) integrated command. In 1976, under President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, French deterrence was ‘extended’ to West Germany, and the French defense budget gave priority, for the first time in 15 years, to conventional forces as a means of waging a non-nuclear war in Europe.1 This change of policy mattered most to the French public because the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was only concerned with NATO strategy, not with French ‘protection.’ Nevertheless, the contrast between these two decisions shows that, during this span of ten years, France tried to reconcile with the United States and that its strategy drew closer to NATO plans. This chapter describes the main features of this evolution and argues that strategy cannot be separated from the perceptions French leaders had of the international status of their country. Whereas the ‘break’ with NATO was part and parcel of the Gaullist attempt to ‘melt’ the Eastern and Western Blocs, détente impaired French freedom of action under the presidency of Georges Pompidou (1969-1974). Under Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (1974-1981), both French and foreign commentators frequently referred to France as a ‘medium power,’ especially compared to West Germany. It was then openly acknowledged that the Gaullist program had been overly ambitious.
