ABSTRACT
In this chapter, I elaborate on the precise nature of the neopragmatist agenda for the social sciences, which I have been developing over the past couple of years and which I have tried to crystallize in Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Towards Pragmatism (Baert 2005) and a number of other publications (e.g. Baert 2006, 2007). I try to argue that this neopragmatist agenda changes our priorities about social research, and that its significance can be shown especially in relation to the writings of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Emmanuel Levinas. My argument is very much a plea for integrating insights from American neopragmatism and continental European hermeneutics and phenomenology, which although prima facie very different traditions, have a non-representational view of knowledge and language in common, as well as a commitment to putting the ongoing engagement with difference at the centre of philosophy. I will argue that this new way of thinking about philosophy has repercussions for how we think and conduct social research, including in International Relations (IR), in ways that tie in especially neatly with the recent debates around, for instance, public sociology. By pragmatism, I refer to the distinct philosophical tradition, initially set
in motion by Charles S. Peirce, later developed by William James and John Dewey, and further articulated by Richard Bernstein and Richard Rorty. This philosophical tradition is often portrayed as quintessentially American, and for very good reasons. Not only did the major pragmatists live and work in the United States, but their philosophical works emerged in response to distinctly American problems and concerns – they expressed distinctly American sentiments, hopes and anxieties. This is not to say that pragmatism is solely an American enterprise. Some European philosophers of the nineteenth century, such as Henri Bergson and Friedrich Nietzsche, developed views that were remarkably close to those of pragmatism, as did the Oxford-based philosopher F.C.S. Schiller at the beginning of the twentieth century. Some of the older generation of American pragmatists studied in Europe, had regular intellectual exchanges with European intellectuals, and were very much indebted to them. More recent exponents of pragmatist philosophy, such as Rorty and Bernstein, engaged with and saw affinities with a number of continental European authors who were considered
seriously out of line within the analytical tradition. The multiplicity of influences is not surprising, given that American pragmatism has always portrayed itself as non-doctrinaire, open and receptive to new ideas, in contrast to the boundary-consciousness of analytical philosophy and its general disdain towards much written in the German and French tradition. If American pragmatism has been shown to be open to European philo-
sophy, the latter has been less receptive towards the former. There are notable exceptions, such as Jürgen Habermas (1968, 1984), whose critique of positivism and theory of communicative action drew on Peirce and the pragmatist tradition. All too often, however, pragmatism has been discarded as a parochial endeavour, too deeply ingrained in American society and its problems to appeal to a broader philosophical audience. Underlying my contribution is the conviction that this picture of pragmatism is deeply misleading. By integrating American neopragmatism and two key continental European philosophies – hermeneutics and phenomenology – I demonstrate not only the bearing of pragmatism on contemporary philosophy of social science, but also the fruitfulness of a continued dialogue between the two traditions, which on the surface look so different.1
