ABSTRACT
In fact, however, most of what children need for their healthy development is best viewed as a matter of moral entitlement quite like what autonomous adults demand for themselves, resting on notions of negative liberty, contract, and equality. Only modest conceptual modifi cation is necessary to account for children’s lack of autonomy – namely, allowing for their rights more routinely to be exercised by a proxy (rather than only occasionally, as with autonomous adults). Moreover, the scope of children’s moral rights extends to all aspects of their family life, including formation and termination of family relationships, just as does the scope of adults’ rights. From the fi rst moment of a child’s life, we should ask not ( just) what can we who happen to care about the child do to improve his or her life, but what rights does that child have that prohibit us, individually or collectively, from doing things detrimental to his or her well-being and life prospects, including a poor choice of caregivers.
