ABSTRACT
As others have noted, the concept of white-collar crime has been ambiguous and problematic since its inception (Croall, 2001, pp. 143-144; Weisburd et al., 1991, p. 170). In some ways, the conceptual ambiguity surrounding white-collar crime has only gotten worse as time has passed. When Sutherland rst introduced the term, the debate regarding whitecollar crime focused primarily on whether it should be restricted strictly to activities that were encompassed by criminal legislation or more broadly construed to include activities that were illegal in the sense that they violated regulatory, but not necessarily criminal, codes (Sutherland, 1945; Tappan, 1947). It was a debate about what should count as crime and as the legitimate object of study for the criminologist. In the ensuing years, arguments have arisen regarding who the o ender is or even what the o ender is. Should the focus of study be limited to individuals or does it make sense to conceive of organizations themselves as o enders (Braithwaite and Fisse, 1990; Cressey, 1989)? In regard to individuals, there is disagreement over who should be included in the white-collar criminal category. Should it be restricted only to people of “respectability and high social status,” or should we acknowledge, in light of a host of recent research ndings, that many people who do not have high social status commit o enses that for all intents and purposes seem to be white-collar crimes (Benson and Moore, 1992; Croall, 1989; Weisburd et al., 1991).
